Scenarios 2027 / Scenarios
Rated at Standard Severe. Likelihood type: idiosyncratic. Source of scores: ginc-desk-v0.2.
At 12:33 the frequency drops and the grid operator's protective relays do what they were designed to do: they shed everything. Sixty million people lose power in five seconds. Mobile networks run on batteries for four hours, then go dark. Card payments stop; the cash machines are already empty. Water pressure fails on the third day in the hill suburbs. Hospitals run on diesel and discover the fuel contracts assumed a 24-hour outage. The restart takes 19 hours in the capital and four days in the regions where black-start capacity was retired to save money. Then the second phase: a generation shortfall that cannot be closed before winter, so the government publishes a rationing calendar and industry runs three days a week. Whether the trigger was an intrusion into the operator's control network, a solar storm, a cyber-physical attack on substations, or a protection misconfiguration is debated for months; the capabilities that failed are the same list in every version: reserve generation, black start, telecoms backup power, cash and payments continuity, fuel logistics and the ability to tell people what to do when no screen works.
The dateline is illustrative, not a forecast. The narrative is hypothetical; the historical anchors below are real events.
The national power grid and communications fail for 72 hours and operate under rationing for 90 days. The cause may be cyber attack, physical sabotage, cascading technical failure or space weather; the scenario is origin-agnostic because the capability loaded is the same. v0.2 reframed v0.1's 'systemic cyber attack' around power, following Switzerland (electricity shortage second of 44 hazards), the UK National Risk Register (national electricity transmission failure rated catastrophic) and the Iberian blackout of April 2025.
| Event | Date | What happened | Calibrates |
|---|---|---|---|
| Iberian blackout | 28 April 2025 | Spain and Portugal lost power across the peninsula; tens of millions affected; most supply restored within a day | restart times, cash and telecoms dependence |
| CrowdStrike outage | 19 July 2024 | A faulty update disabled about 8.5 million Windows devices; airlines, hospitals and payments disrupted worldwide | accidental systemic failure |
| Ukraine grid attacks | December 2015, December 2016, 2022–2024 | Cyber attacks on distribution, then sustained missile and drone strikes on generation | adversarial variant |
| NotPetya | June 2017 | Destructive malware; losses around US$10 billion | destructive cyber |
| Texas winter storm | February 2021 | Around 4.5 million customers without power; more than 200 deaths | cascading infrastructure under weather |
| Lloyd's cyber scenario | October 2023 | Major cyber attack on payment systems: five-year global loss US$3.5 trillion | systemic impact |
| Allianz Risk Barometer 2026 | January 2026 | Cyber incidents top business risk for the fifth year (42 per cent of 3,338 respondents) | business exposure |
Shown at their preset values. Parameters are not adjustable in this release and nothing on this page is computed from them. Custom settings run (Phase B) but are labelled 'non-standard run' and excluded from comparisons.
| Parameter | Default | Range or options | Note |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sectors affected | power and telecoms | options: plus payments / water / transport | — |
| National outage duration | 72 hours | 12 hours to 14 days | — |
| Rationing period | 90 days | 0–365 | — |
| Origin | cyber | options: physical / accidental / space weather | — |
| Destructive versus disruptive | disruptive | — | Destructive at Extreme |
| Share of population affected | 80 per cent | 30–100 | — |
High: capability band shifts expected under current plans. Medium: band shifts under 'none' policy response only. Low: strain without band shift. Loads are judgement-based until the Atlas connects. Domains link to the Atlas.
| Domain | Load | Channel |
|---|---|---|
| Hard | ||
| Defence and security | Medium | military support, security of key sites, cyber defence |
| Strategic infrastructure | High | grid, black start, telecoms, water, fuel distribution |
| Critical technology | High | cybersecurity, control systems, GNSS and timing dependence |
| Soft | ||
| Government effectiveness | High | emergency management, communication, rationing administration |
| Human capital | Medium | health continuity; vulnerable populations |
| Influence and cohesion | Medium | public order, trust, information integrity during outage |
| Economic | ||
| Macro-financial | High | payments continuity, cash availability, output loss |
| Industry, trade and supply | High | production stoppages, cold chains, logistics |
| Energy and resources | High | generation adequacy, fuel stocks |
| Region | Exposure | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| North America | Medium | Ageing grid, extreme weather, cyber |
| Europe | Medium | Interconnected but exposed to sabotage and renewables integration |
| China | Medium | Strong state capacity; cyber-physical targets |
| Indo-Pacific | Medium | Taiwan's grid concentration |
| South Asia | High | Pakistan 2023 nationwide blackout; India 2012 |
| Gulf and Middle East | Medium | Desalination dependence |
| Africa | High | South African load-shedding; fragile grids; no backup depth |
| Latin America and Caribbean | High | Venezuela 2019; Ecuador 2024 rationing |
| Russia and Eurasia | Medium | Ukraine under attack |
| Indicator | Source | Threshold |
|---|---|---|
| Reserve margin forecasts | — | — |
| Grid frequency and protection incidents | ENTSO-E, NERC | — |
| ICS and OT vulnerability advisories | — | — |
| Telecoms backup power compliance | — | — |
| Cash in circulation and ATM density | — | — |
| Black-start test results | — | — |
| Kp index forecasts (space-weather variant) | — | — |
| Utility ransomware incidents | — | — |
From the GINC 250: trends rated Very high or Critical for this scenario. All S12 trend scores.
| Rating | Band or level | Why |
|---|---|---|
| Likelihood, two years | 3Possible | Nationwide outages above 24 hours remain rare in large economies, but several occurred in 2023–2025 across the 197; a 72-hour outage plus rationing is a tail for most. |
| Likelihood, ten years | 4Likely | — |
| Systemic impact | 2Moderate | Unless a global hub. |
| National impact | 4Severe | — |
| Confidence | low | Cyber-physical likelihoods are poorly evidenced. |
Source of scores: ginc-desk-v0.2. Confidence refers to the rating, not the scenario. Calibration sources are listed with the anchors above and on the methodology page.
Contested assumptions for the panel to resolve.
No signed commentary in this build.
0.2.0 · active0.2.0 · 2 October 2026 · Entered the Library at v0.2 with GINC desk scores.GINC (2027). Scenario S12 Critical infrastructure collapse, Scenario Library v0.2. scenarios.ginc.org/library/critical-infrastructure-collapseContent and data are published under CC BY 4.0.